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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether intangibles might explain the UK productivity puzzle.  We note that 
since the recession: (a) firms have upskilled faster than before; (b) intangible investment in R&D and 
software has risen whereas tangible investment has fallen; and (c) intangible and telecoms equipment 
investment slowed in advance of the recession.  We have therefore tested to see if: (a) what looks like 
labour hoarding is actually firms keeping workers who are employed in creating intangible assets; (b) 
the current slowdown in TFP growth is due to the spillover effects of the past slowdown in R&D and 
telecoms equipment investment.  Our main findings are: (a) measured market sector real value added 
growth since the start of 2008 is understated by 1.6% due to the omission of intangibles; (b) 0.75pppa 
of the TFP growth slowdown can be accounted for by the slowdown in intangible and telecoms 
investment in the early 2000s.  Taken together intangible investment can therefore account for around 
5 percentage points of the 16% productivity puzzle. 
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1. Introduction 
Between 2007 and 2009 real UK market sector value added fell by 7.4%.  Market sector hours worked 
fell by 3.5% and hence market sector productivity fell by 4%.
1
  In 2010, hours started to grow again, 
but output has grown very slowly.  Between 2011 and 2012Q3, the latest period for which market 
sector data are available, hours have grown by 3.4% but market sector value added by 0%. Hence 
productivity has fallen by 3.4%. Market sector output per hour is now around 16% below its pre-crisis 
trend. Why? 
 
The standard explanation for the initial fall in productivity is labour hoarding.  In most previous 
recessions, firms cut output but kept labour in reserve for the recovery.  Productivity, output per 
worker, falls at first, but then recovers as the firm uses the reserve inputs.  Strictly speaking the fall in 
productivity is mismeasurement since the output per utilised input is the same, but with utilisation 
typically poorly measured this shows up as a fall, then rise, in productivity.   
 
This explanation seems to carry less and less weight for the post 2008 years, for it seems very unlikely 
that firms are still carrying underutilised workers four years on.  Further, as we document below, 
during the recession and since, firms have upskilled at a much faster pace (skill-adjusted labour 
composition rose at 0.5%pa 2005-08, but at 1.1% after 2008
2
).  Thus if firms are holding onto 
workers, it is the high skilled, not the low skilled.   
 
Therefore a number of different explanations of the UK productivity puzzle have been put forward.  
First, there are the arguments on labour hoarding and labour utilisation noted above.  Second, that this 
recession has come at a time of greater labour market flexibility so that declines in real wages have 
allowed firms to keep on less productive workers.   At the same time the financial crisis may have 
increased the cost of capital so that at the margin firms are substituting away from capital and towards 
labour, thus reducing labour productivity.  Third, that the financial crisis has impaired the re-
allocation of capital and that there is less migration of capital away from low return activity to higher 
returns (Broadbent, 2012).  Fourth, that a greater degree of forbearance and also increased risk 
aversion on the part of banks has resulted in less entry and exit since the recession, with ‘zombie 
firms’ maintained and few high productivity entrants.  Fifth, that a decline in business investment has 
                                                     
1 Productivity as measured by GDP per hour looks very similar.  For example, GDP in 2012, for which complete data are 
now available, rose by 0.0% (data downloaded in January 2013).  We prefer to work with market sector output where 
possible in this paper, given the problems of accurately measuring government output. 
2 Average growth for 2005 to 2008 and 2009 to 2010 for the market sector  (Acheson and Franklin, 2012) 
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reduced the capital-labour ratio and therefore labour productivity.  We consider here a potential sixth 
explanation to do with the role of intangible investment in terms of both measurement and its impact 
on growth.  
 
In this paper we thus examine the role of intangibles. A broad range of intangible assets are included, 
under three main intangible asset classes, based on the definitions first developed in Corrado, Hulten 
and Sichel (2005). Firstly, computerised information (mainly software), secondly, innovative property 
(covering scientific and non-scientific R&D) and finally firm-specific resources (company spending 
on reputation, human and organisational capital. 
 
To examine the role of intangibles, our starting point is the observation that whilst investment in 
tangibles, plant/vehicles/buildings has fallen and stayed low, a point perhaps not noticed is that 
investment in intangibles, specifically Research and Development (R&D) and software has risen since 
the recession (software fell and has since been rising, R&D was flat and then rose).  Consider then a 
firm who has reduced production but maintained investment in intangibles.  Its skill level rises, since 
intangible investment typically requires high qualified workers.  Its measured output falls, since the 
output of e.g. R&D projects might not manifest itself for a few years.  Thus labour productivity falls, 
in a pattern that looks just like labour hoarding.   
 
There is a second effect.  Although intangible investment has been relatively robust over the 
recession, it fell before 2008.  This was because there was a huge surge in intangible investment in the 
late 1990s around the introduction of the internet, with new software, machinery etc.  In addition, as is 
well known, R&D investment as a share of GDP has been falling for quite some time in the UK.  If 
such investment has spillovers, and they take some time, then it might be that productivity/total factor 
productivity (TFP) would have fallen in the late 2000s anyway, due to the slowdown in intangible 
investment in the early 2000s.   
 
This paper then reviews these hypotheses.  It therefore attempts to add an additional hypothesis to that 
literature on the UK productivity puzzle.  There is a wide range of commentary and articles written on 
the productivity puzzle and offering a number of different explanations
3
.  For example, the 
productivity puzzle has been discussed in various speeches by MPC members including Dale (2011), 
                                                     
3Explanations for the recent weakness in productivity are summarised in a box on page 33 of the November 2012 Inflation 
Report. 
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Broadbent (2012) and Weale (2012) and by other commentators such as Martin and Rowthorn (2012). 
See also Hughes and Saleheen (2012) for the UK productivity puzzle in an historical and international 
perspective.  See ONS (2012a, 2012b) for a measurement perspective on the productivity puzzle and 
ONS (2013) for a microdata perspective.  See Disney et al (2013) for a review of most of the 
explanations put forward to explain the productivity puzzle.  
 
Our main conclusions are as follows.  First, measured market sector real value added growth since the 
start of 2008 is understated by 1.6% due to the omission of intangibles. Second, TFP growth would 
have slowed down anyway by around 0.75pppa.  The actual slowdown has been much larger than this, 
since TFP has gone from a pre-recession average of 1.39%pa (2002-7) to -2.29%pa (2007-10)
4
. Taken 
together this accounts for around 5 percentage points of the 16% productivity puzzle. 
 
2. Productivity, TFP growth and investment 
IIa. Some facts  
Figure 1 shows the UK productivity puzzle for the market sector.  As the figure shows, market sector 
output per hour
5
 fell very sharply in 2008, but then recovered somewhat afterward before falling 
again.  Output per hour is around 16 per cent below its pre-crisis trend.   Mechanically, there has been 
weak output growth combined with a much more robust labour market than most people expected.  
Hours have not fallen by as much as previous falls in output would predict.   
 
Figure 1: UK Labour Productivity Index (2008=100) 
 
                                                     
4 Estimates based on Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis (2012a), where R&D, software, artistic originals and mineral exploration 
are the only intangibles capitalised.  Data extended to 2010 using ONS TFP estimates.   
5 Note the market sector data underlying this chart (and Figure 6) differ slightly from that quoted from ONS.  The ONS data 
include private delivery of education and health and exclude public services in section ‘O’.  These data are based on GHW 
(2012) and do not include private health/education and do not exclude public services in ‘O’. 
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Notes: Solid line is an index of output per hour worked.  Dark red line is a trend of output per hour worked prior to the 
recession.  Data from Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis (2012a), for the UK market sector, based on a National Accounts 
definition of GDP where software, artistic originals and mineral exploration are the only capitalised intangibles.   
 
Figure 2 sets out the TFP growth picture (TFP calculated as output per hour less share weighted 
capital and labour services per hour).  It shows the weakness of the recovery in TFP, with the current 
situation remarkably similar to the UK experience in the 1970s.   
 
Figure 2: Index of TFP following UK recessions 
 
Notes: TFP estimates taken from the UK EUKLEMS dataset and extended using ONS estimates.  X-axis marks the number 
of years from each recession.  TFP has been estimated accounting for changes in labour composition. 
 
The difference between productivity and TFP is that the latter accounts for changes in capital 
deepening and labour composition.  To shed light on capital deepening, Figure 3 shows business 
investment over the same period, with investment broken out into (non-residential) buildings, total 
plant & machinery (including computers), software and R&D.  The data show the well-known 
collapse in buildings and plant investment after 2007 and the remaining low investment levels.  Less 
well-known, however are the levels of R&D and software investment.  Both hardly fell over the 
period and indeed have risen in contrast to other categories.   
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Figure 3: Index of UK nominal private sector investment in selected assets (2008=100) 
 
Notes: Data for buildings, plant and machinery (P&M) and software are private sector business investment in current prices. 
Since this is business investment, buildings exclude dwellings.  The data for software only refer to purchased and do not 
include own-account.  Data for Plant & Machinery include ICT hardware.  The data for R&D are the BERD data for Total 
Civil intramural R&D. Source: Buildings, P&M (Blue Book tables); Software (GFCF First Release); R&D (BERD) 
 
Table 1 shows recent labour productivity and TFP growth for the UK before and during the recession 
from a number of sources. 
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Table 1: Productivity and Labour Composition before and during the recession 
 
Notes: Data for 2012 in column 1 are extrapolated from three quarters of data.  Data in column 1 do not quite match figures 
in introduction since those are to 2012Q3.  Columns 2 and 3 are the contributions of labour composition and capital 
deepening as reported in ONS TFP estimates.  TFP estimates in columns 4 to 6 are estimated accounting for labour 
composition.  Note that ONS estimates of TFP and factor contributions do not sum to labour productivity as the data are 
from different sources and apply to different aggregations (factor contributions refer to the whole economy and ONS TFP to 
the market sector).   Abbreviations: V=GDP; H=actual person-hours; L=labour services; K=capital services.. Sources: 
Column 1 (ONS Labour Productivity First Release); Columns 2, 3 and 5 (ONS TFP estimates); Columns 4 and 7 
(Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis, 2012a); Column 6 (The Conference Board, Total Economy Database); Column 8 (ONS 
Labour Productivity data).   
 
Data for growth in labour productivity, measured as growth in value-added per hour worked, are 
presented in column 1.  The story they tell is by now familiar.  Labour productivity fell sharply in the 
recession of 2008 and 2009, but has remained weak in the recovery and the decline in productivity in 
the second recession of 2012 is even greater than that in either year of the initial recession itself.   
 
IIb.  Capital/labour substitution and labour hoarding 
Columns 2 and 3 show the contributions to labour productivity growth of growth in capital services 
per hour and labour services per hour.  Both columns shed light on two hypotheses concerning the 
labour market.  One is that the decline in real wages has lowered the relative price of labour to capital 
thus incentivising substitution away from capital towards labour.  At the same time, tightening of 
credit conditions since the financial crisis might have further increased the relative price of capital.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δln(V/H) 
(without 
intangibles, 
market sector)
sL.Δln(L/H) 
(contribution 
of labour 
composition, 
whole 
economy)
sK.Δln(K/H) 
(contribution 
of capital 
deepening, 
whole 
economy)
ΔlnTFP (with 
intangibles, 
market sector)
Utilisation 
(hours per 
worker, market 
sector (000's))
ONS ONS ONS GHW(2012) ONS
Conference Board: Total 
Economy Database
GHW(2012) ONS
2001-07 2.7% 0.4% 1.0% 1.3% 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 1.71
2008 -1.6% 0.3% 1.0% -1.9% -2.3% -0.8% -2.0% 1.70
2009 -2.3% 1.0% 1.6% -5.0% -3.6% -4.4% -5.1% 1.67
2010 1.5% 0.9% 0.6% - 0.4% 0.3% - 1.68
2011 0.1% - - - - -0.4% - 1.68
2012 -2.8% - - - - - - -
ΔlnTFP (without intangibles, market sector)
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The data here give some slight support for this view.  As column 3 shows, the contribution of capital 
services per hour up to the recession was 1% pa.  In 2009, that contribution rose strongly, that is, 
labour was reduced more than capital.  In 2010 by contrast, the contribution fell quite markedly, 
suggesting that firms are, relative to before, substituting towards labour.  This pattern is reflected in 
columns 4, 5, and 6 which show TFP growth.  As we set out below, TFP growth measures labour 
productivity growth controlling for capital/labour inputs.  TFP growth declined very sharply in the 
recession, suggesting that labour productivity did not just fall due to capital/labour substitution.  
 
A second view is labour hoarding.  Rowthorn and Martin (2012) advance the view that the fall in 
labour productivity is due to labour hiring behaviour.  Consider a firm with “overhead” and “variable” 
labour.  An initial fall in demand causes overhead labour to be hoarded and variable to be fired, 
though these effects are moderated with a fall in real wages.  Productivity falls as overhead labour is 
under-utilised.  A recovery in demand, at low wages, causes variable labour to be hired.  Productivity 
rises as overhead labour utilisation recovers, but might fall as more labour is hired.  To get an overall 
fall in productivity and then no rise in the employment recovery, they posit high and low productivity 
sectors.  In the initial recession the high productivity sector fired variable labour and kept on overhead 
labour at low utilisation.  In the recovery, that sector hired few new workers and raised utilisation: a 
jobless recovery with rising productivity in that sector.  The low productivity sector by contrast fired 
both types, so that in the recovery they hired both types, lowering overall productivity via a mix 
effect.  They present evidence that the recovery in employment since 2008 has been entirely in the 
low productivity sector (see their Chart 14 and Table 12, www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/BM_Report3.pdf).  
(their high productivity sectors are manufacturing, financial and business services, low productivity 
are agriculture, construction, distribution, hotels and restaurants).   
 
One way to look at the Martin/Rowthorn hypothesis is via labour composition indices.  These are 
indices of labour hours adjusted for various dimensions of labour composition (e.g. skill, age, gender).  
In practice they are driven by skill levels so that if the index of labour composition rises (labour 
services per hour worked), then firms are increasingly hiring more skilled workers per hour worked.  
ONS data for the contribution of quality-adjusted labour services per hour worked is presented in 
Column 2 of Table 1.  If low-skilled labour had been hoarded, we would expect the contribution of 
labour composition to either grow less fast or even decline.  But growth in the contribution of labour 
composition in 2009 and 2010 has been extremely strong, suggesting the opposite has occurred.  That 
is that firms have hoarded high-skilled labour at the expense of low-skilled.  This is borne out in the 
analysis contained in Acheson (2011) and Acheson and Franklin (2012).  Note that this is also 
consistent with the data for R&D investment in Figure 1, and other categories of intangible 
9 
 
investment, all consistent with the idea that it is the higher skilled “knowledge workers” that have 
been kept on by firms.   
 
However, the Rowthorn/Martin view is across different sectors. In the recession, they argue, the high 
productivity sectors have hoarded relatively more skilled labour and let go relatively more unskilled.  
Thus they should have a relatively large rise in labour composition.  In the recovery, the high 
productivity sector employs more fully their hoarded skilled workers and takes on relatively few 
unskilled.  The low productivity sectors, take on relatively more low skilled labour.  So again, the 
high productivity sector should have a relatively high rise in composition.  The data from Acheson 
and Franklin (2012) do not support this version of the Rowthorn/Martin view. In the initial recession 
growth in labour composition was 1.6%pa and 2.5%pa in the high and low productivity sectors and in 
the recovery 1.9% and 2.0%.  Thus, in the recession, the low productivity sectors retained relatively 
more skilled than the high productivity and in the recovery have hired relatively more skilled than the 
high productivity sectors
6
.  The data used to make this comparison are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Changes in labour composition during and after the 2008-09 recession 
 
                                                     
6 This takes Table 2 and 3 in Acheson and Franklin (2012) and allocates as low productivity sectors (following 
Rowthorn/Martin) Agriculture, Wholesale/Retail, Administration, Public services and Arts (ABDE, GI, LMN, OPQ and 
RSTU), the rest being high productivity and calculates the averages of “labour quality index per hour” for high and low, for 
2008-9 and 2009-10. 
Rowthorn & 
Martin:  Low 
(L) / High (H) 
productivity 
sectors
2008Q1 - 09Q2: 
Change in labour 
composition 
(Δln(L/H)
2009Q3 - 10Q4: 
Change in labour 
composition 
(Δln(L/H)
Whole economy 1.7 1.5
Market sector 1.1 0.6
Agriculture & Mining L 2.7 2.4
Manufacturing 1.1 1.0
Construction 2.4 -1.3
Distribution L 2.3 1.9
Transport -0.1 1.1
Information & Communication 4.0 4.4
Financial Services 0.8 4.3
Professional & Administrative Services L 1.4 2.8
Public Services L 1.3 1.1
Arts & Recreation L 4.6 1.6
Average High 1.6 1.9
Average Low 2.5 2.0
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Notes: The table sets out the data from Acheson and Franklin (2012) showing changes in labour composition between the 
dates indicated, with the second column marking the low productivity sectors (the others being high) as best we can match to 
the Martin/Rowthorn classification.  The final row shows average changes for the high productivity and low productivity 
sectors.  
 
IIb.  Direct evidence on utilisation.  
Direct evidence is very hard to come by on utilisation since it is so hard to observe.  Basu et al (2006) 
suggest a theory to measure it essentially by actual hours per worker per year (H/N)
7
.  To do this, they 
suggest estimating the regression 
(1) ˆˆln ln( / )MEASTFP H N      
providing an estimate of ˆ which allows us to form a measure of TFP adjusted for the impact of 
utilisation as 
(2) ˆln ln . ln( / )ADJ MEASTFP TFP H N      
In contrast to results in the US, as in Basu et al (2006), it turns out that in the UK data ˆ is relatively 
small at 0.39 (compared to ˆ >1 in the US data).  The adjustment to TFP is shown in the following 
chart.
8
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 Consider a firm employing N workers for H hours per worker, working with unobserved effort E per hour.  Labour input is 
then NG(E,H), where G transforms the bundle of E and H into per worker effort-hours.  A firm wishing to raise E or H will 
face some costs of doing so.  Assume they are a function of EH and that firms are optimising on all margins.  Then the first 
order condition holds: dG/dH(H/G)=dG/dE(E/G).  Log linearising, one can write the unobservable E/N in terms of the 
observable H/N as lnE/N=βln(H/N) as is done above. 
8 Note that utilisation is partly controlled for in the factor shares following the Berndt-Fuss-Hulten theorem.  A new building 
for example raises lnK.  But if is it unoccupied, then its rent income is zero, hence sK
Q=0 and so it has no impact on lnQ.  
Thus insofar as utilisation is reflected in prices, the income share controls for underutilisation. Berndt-Fuss-Hulten point out 
that when the operating surplus is calculated residually asset compensation reflects the actual marginal product of capital, in 
this case zero, thus partly accounting for utilisation in the estimation of TFP. 
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Figure 4: Measured TFP .vs. TFP adjusted for utilisation 
 
Notes: Red line is UK market sector TFP (ONS).  Estimates for hours per worker are from ONS data for market sector hours 
and workers as used in the Labour Productivity First Release.  Blue line is UK market sector TFP adjusted for utilisation.  
Recession marked with blue columns.   
 
Looking at the years prior to the recession utilisation adjusted TFP was higher than measured TFP in 
the early 2000s.  The adjustment in the years immediately before the recession was very small.  The 
major interest is in 2008 to 2009.  As the graph shows, adjusting for utilisation removes some of its 
impact from TFP, suggesting TFP did not fall as fast as in the measured data.  The adjustments are not 
that large however.  The reason is that in 2009 TFP (ONS) was -3.6%.  In that year ln( / )H N (ONS) 
was -1.6%.  Our UK estimate for ˆ is 0.39.  The contribution of utilisation in 2009 is therefore 
(0.39*-0.016=)-0.6%, thus adding 0.6% to TFP.  Note that if the UK estimate of ˆ were more similar 
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to that found in the US, say ˆ =1.0089 the contribution of utilisation would be (1.008*-0.016=)1.59% 
and would explain around 44% of the fall in TFP.
10
 
 
3. The relation between productivity, TFP growth and investment 
To explain these data let us set out a slightly more formal model.  Consider the following framework.  
Let output Q be a function of the services of labour, L,  tangible capital, K,  and intangible capital, R, 
with a shift term A.  Then we can write GDP in terms of a production function and in terms of 
nominal expenditure as  
(3) 
( , , )t t t t tQ A F L K R
V C I
Q C I N

 
  
 
Where I and N are the real values of tangible and intangible investment.  V is the sum of consumption 
and tangible investment and will appear below.  This means we can write the relation between 
measured output growth, lnV and true output growth, lnQ, which is  
(4) 
,ln ln ( ln ln )Q Nt t t t tQ V s N V       
 
We are now in a position to review the possible biases due to omitted intangibles. First, if in the 
recovery DlnN>DlnV, for which we have seen some evidence in Figure 3, measured DlnV 
understates true, DlnQ.   
The term  , ln lnQ Nt t ts N V   is an estimate of the bias to measured output if intangibles are not 
treated as capital goods.  We consider the full range of intangible assets proposed in Corrado, Hulten 
and Sichel (2005)
11
.  Since our intangibles dataset only extends to 2009, some assumptions to extend 
the series have been made.  First we assume that the intangible investment share (excluding software, 
mineral exploration and artistic originals), 
,Q N
ts , is the same in 2010, 2011 and 2012 as it was in 2009 
                                                     
9 Basu et al (2006) report estimates of ˆ for durables manufacturing (1.34), nondurables manufacturing (2.13) and 
nonmanufacturing (0.64).  Applying some approximate weights for each within the UK market sector of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.7 
respectively, yields a comparable estimate of ˆ =1.008. 
10 To see how much this matters in the US, the Fernald quarterly TFP growth series, www.frbsf.org/csip/tfp.php, and Fernald 
(2010) show that measured TFP growth was -1.66 and -1.39 in 2008 and 2009, but when utilisation adjusted was 0.47 and 
2.51.  
11
 Therefore including: software; scientific R&D; non-scientific R&D; design; artistic originals; mineral 
exploration; financial product innovation; training; advertising; market research; organisational capital.  
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(at 0.09).  Second we assume that real intangible investment is growing at the same rate as real R&D 
investment in 2010 and 2011, and that the rate for real R&D investment is the same in 2012 as in 
2011.  Estimates of real measured growth and changes in the output deflator have also been extended 
with the latest ONS data. The following chart presents an estimate of this bias term. 
 
Figure 5: Bias in measurement of real final output if intangibles are not capitalised  
 
Notes: Chart presents the correction to real output growth if intangible investment is not included in final output.  So, for 
example, in 2011, real output growth should be 0.50% higher than it is measured.  For 2012 that figure is 0.57%.  Recession 
highlighted. 
 
The chart shows that in the late 1990s, when there was an intangible investment boom, the term is 
positive, that is value-added including intangibles was growing faster than measured value-added.  In 
general for much of the 2000s the term is negative, with growth in intangible output weaker than 
measured final output, suggesting growth was being overstated during that time.  However in 2009 the 
term is positive and suggests an understatement to output growth of 0.1%.  The terms for 2010 and 
2011 suggest an understatement of 0.12% and 0.5% respectively.  In 2011 and 2012 market sector 
-0.30%
-0.20%
-0.10%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
0.70%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 lo
gs
Gap between growth in value-added including and excluding intangibles 
(numbers are additional to measured real output growth if intangibles are 
included)
Recession bias_term
14 
 
GVA growth was 1.17% and -0.26% pa respectively.
 12
  Thus the bias of 0.57% for 2012 means 
output growth would instead would be 0.31% pa rather than negative.   
The impact of this in terms of labour productivity can be seen in Figure 6.  There the red line is an 
index of market sector labour productivity (GDP per hour) as conventionally measured, and the green 
line an index of labour productivity with the underlying output measure adjusted to treat intangible 
spending as capital investment.  As can be seen, by 2012, not accounting for intangibles results in the 
index of labour productivity being underestimated by around 1.6 index points.
13
  The reason is that 
market sector growth since the start of 2008 is -4.4%, but adjusted market sector growth is 
approximately -2.8%.  
 
Figure 6: UK Labour Productivity Index adjusted for intangibles (2008=100) 
 
Notes: Red line is measured labour productivity and dark red line is trend labour productivity based on the pre-crisis data as 
in Figure 1, with software, mineral exploration and artistic originals the only intangibles that are capitalised.  Green line uses 
an output measure adjusted for the capitalisation of all other intangibles in the Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005) 
framework.  Data are based on Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis (2012a).  Data for intangible investment in 2010 to 2012 have 
been projected forward using data for R&D investment as reported in BERD.   
 
4. Spillovers 
Intangible investment affects the productivity growth of the firm undertaking the investment.  But it 
has an additional effect if there are spillovers.  There is a large body of work suggesting that R&D has 
spillover effects to other firms see e.g. Griliches (1973) for a survey, concentrating mostly on US 
work, and Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis (2012b) for recent work for the UK.   
                                                     
12 This estimate for 2012 is extrapolated from three quarters of data 
13 Taking the self-employed out of the headline measure of productivity also accounts for about 1 per cent of the productivity 
puzzle. 
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A number of US authors (e.g. Fernald (2012)) have noted a slowdown in US TFP growth before the 
2008 recession, which they ascribe in turn to a slowdown in intangible investment in the early 2000s 
following the heavy burst of intangible investment in the late 1990s internet/computer boom.  In the 
UK, there has also been a sustained slowdown in UK R&D/GDP spend noted by a number of authors 
and policy-makers.  We thus examine the data for the UK: was there an intangible investment 
slowdown and might that have slowed down underlying TFP growth before the recession? 
Figure 7 sets out intangible and tangible investment as a proportion of GDP.  Intangible investment 
rose since the 1980s, but slowed down in the early 2000s.  Tangible investment has generally been in 
decline throughout the 2000s.  So if there are spillovers from intangible investment to TFP and if they 
take, say two years to show up, then TFP growth in the late 2000s would slow.  Of course, it might 
well slow down before the shock of 2008 and the shock might have an additional effect, but even so, 
there remains the possibility that at least some of the slowdown might be due to a feed through from 
the earlier slowdown in intangible investment. 
 
Figure 7: Nominal tangible and intangible investment as a proportion of nominal GDP 
 
Note s: Tangible and intangible investment as a share of GDP.  In each GDP has been adjusted for the capitalisation of 
intangibles.  Data from Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis (2012a). 
 
Figure 8 shows the changes in capital stocks as a result of this investment, along with changes in 
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the internet is that it is a (very large) piece of communications capital equipment, building on older 
telecoms capital and being augmented by broadband and mobile technologies. If one thinks of such 
equipment as building networks it is very natural to ask if there is any evidence of spillovers from 
telecoms equipment.  As Corrado (2010) points out, there are many channels through which 
communications capital deepening may have contributed to improved growth in TFP e.g. improved 
opportunity and ability for collaboration; more effective communication and increased quality of 
information communicated both within and between organisations; improved access to freely 
available knowledge via the internet; and improved organisational and business processes, including 
within supply chains, derived from each of the previous effects described.  Such spillovers could be 
even more substantial in more knowledge-oriented economies. In fact, recent studies (Adams, Black, 
Clemmons and Stephan 2005; Ding, Levin, Stephan and Winkler 2010) have shown a positive impact 
from the internet on academic collaboration and productivity.  
 
Figure 8: Growth in capital services, selected assets 
 
Notes: Data are changes in the log of the capital stock for selected assets.  dlnK(telecom) refers to telecoms equipment 
defined as I-O groups 71 (Insulated wire and cable), 74 (Television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony 
and line telegraphy) and 75 (Television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and 
associated goods).  Recessions marked by blue columns.  Data are from Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis (2012a).   
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The figure shows growth in capital services for each of these intangible groups.  Growth in R&D 
capital was very high in the 1980s before slowing, speeding up again around 2000 and then slowing.  
Growth in telecoms capital was low, even negative, in the early 1990s before growing very fast in the 
late 1990s and then slowing.   In general growth in capital for these assets slows down in the early 
2000s relative to the late 1990s.  If there is a lagged effect on TFP, this would slowdown TFP in the 
late 2000s.  
 
How big might these effects be?  Table 3 sets this out. In this table, TFP growth is measured including 
R&D as an intangible (excluding all other intangibles) to study the possible effects from R&D 
spillovers.  We confine ourselves to R&D since R&D spillovers seem quite well established in the 
literature.  The table reads as follows.  Column 3 sets out TFP growth, estimated including R&D, for 
four year-spans, starting in the trough of 1991, being a trough to peak, peak to trough and another 
cycle.  As the table shows, TFP sped up between late 90s and mid 00s, (1998/02 and 2002-07), 
(0.12%pa), but then slowed down severely in the latest period (-3.68%).   
 
Interestingly, as columns 4 and 5 show, lagged growth in the capital stock for R&D and telecoms 
equipment show a suggestive pattern.  Both sped up in the late 90s relative to the early 90s and late 
90s and then slowed down again.  Both of these speedups were followed by a speedup in TFP growth.  
And both slowdowns were followed, this time in the current cycle, by a slowdown in TFP growth.  
The final two columns show the contribution to the DlnTFP speedup and slowdown, being a 
coefficient times the lagged growth in the capital stock.  The coefficients are drawn from Goodridge, 
Haskel and Wallis (2012b) and Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis (2013) and are the elasticities of 
DlnTFP to changes in the stock.  As the final columns show, the 2002-07 slowdown is over predicted, 
but the current slowdown is under predicted.  In fact, the effect from the changes in the stock of R&D 
and telecoms equipment account for 20% ((0.47+0.26)/3.68) of the current slowdown.  So a 
slowdown in current DlnTFP of around 0.75%pa is predicted but these data are insufficient to predict 
the whole very large slowdown.  Of course, much of that slowdown is dominated by the massive fall 
of around 5% of measured TFP in 2008.   
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Table 3: Spillovers and the slowdown in ΔlnTFP 
 
Notes:  Columns 1 and 2 indicate years and peak to trough or trough to peak.  Columns 3, 4, and 5 are lnTFP, lnK(R&D) 
and lnK(telecoms equipment).  Column 6 is lnTFP slowdown, that is the respective row less the row above it.  Columns 7 
and 8 are the indicated coefficient times the slowdown in lnK in the previous periods.  So for example, -0.47 in column 7, 
final row equals 0.25*(DlnK(R&D)(2002-07) - DlnK(R&D)(1998-02)).   Data are from Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis 
(2012a).  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have investigated whether intangibles might explain the UK productivity slowdown.  We have 
noted that since the recession  
a. firms have held onto their more skilled workers and decreased their unskilled workers at an 
increasing rate  
b.  intangible investment in R&D and software has risen whereas tangible investment has fallen. 
c. intangible investment and telecoms equipment slowed in advance of the recession 
We have therefore tested to see if  
a. What looks like labour hoarding is actually firms retaining workers who are employed in creating 
intangible assets (e.g. R&D teams); whose current output is therefore zero and whose contribution 
to total investment is unmeasured since intangibles are treated as expenses not investment 
b. How much the slowdown in current TFP growth is due to the spillover effects of the slowdown in 
R&D and telecoms equipment investment in the past.  
Our main findings are 
a. First, measured market sector real value added growth since the start of 2008 is understated by 
1.6% due to the omission of intangibles. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year Peak/TroughDlnTFP DlnK(rd)
DlnK(com 
equip)
dlnTFP 
slowdown
0.25*lagged 
dlnK(rd) 
slowdown
0.04*lagged 
dlnK(com 
equip) 
slowdown
1991-98 T-P 1.83% 1.60% 1.86%
1998-02 P-T 1.26% 3.75% 8.77%  
2002-07 T-P 1.39% 1.87% 2.28% 0.12% 0.54% 0.28%
2007-10 P-T -2.29% 1.20% -1.94% -3.68% -0.47% -0.26%
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b. 0.75pppa of the TFP growth slowdown can be accounted for by the slowdown in intangible and 
telecoms investment in the early 2000s. 
c. Taken together intangible investment can therefore account for around 5 percentage points of the 
16% productivity puzzle. 
Does that mean the UK still has an output gap?  If potential output growth is determined by TFP 
growth, as it is in many models, our spillover results suggest that potential output growth has fallen.  
But potential output growth is not a given, since intangible investment may be amenable to policy 
levers.  One of those levers might be Keynesian demand expansion. Others might be more on the 
supply side, e.g. expanding the R&D tax credit to other intangible assets. Whichever it is, we believe 
that unmeasured intangibles are part of the explanation of the productivity puzzle, but not all of it. 
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